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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition and
hydration (“ANH”) from a patient in a persistent vegetative state (“PVS”) has
over the last four decades evolved into a significant subject which places
Catholic teaching on medical ethics in conflict with the consensus legal
understanding and the accepted view of professional medical ethicists. After
reviewing the consensus legal and medical view, this Article will trace the
evolution of the teaching of the Roman Catholic Magisterium on the question
1
Professor of Law and Philosophy, DePaul University. A.B. 1965, Stanford University; J.D. 1968,
Columbia University; LL.M. 1974, Harvard University; M.A. 1979, Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1981,
Northwestern University; M.A.A.H. 1995, School of the Art Institute of Chicago; M.L.A. 2001, University
of Chicago; M.A. (Theology) 2014, M. Div. 2016, Catholic Theological Union.
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of providing ANH to patients diagnosed as a PVS. The deviation from the
consensus view of legal authorities and professional medical ethicists will be
examined, along with the evolution of official Catholic teaching on this issue.
A review will be provided of the range of opinion among contemporary
theologians on whether there has been a significant change in the official
Church teaching over time, or whether there has been simply a clarification
in an area that had remained ambiguous with regard to obligation of care and
treatment of non-terminal patients. Finally, an effort will be made to
determine the current teaching of the Magisterium on provision of ANH to
PVS patients and other non-terminal patients, and a judgment whether the
terms of the teaching are in conformity with traditional Church teaching on
care and treatment of patients.
The teaching of the Roman Catholic Church on the provision of care
and treatment of patients is rooted in Scriptural teaching on charity and the
recognition of the human dignity of every person. The developments in
natural law theory in the sixteenth century, which are briefly discussed in this
Article, supported a view shared by medical practitioners and courts that
recognizes a patient’s right to refuse unwanted burdensome treatment.2 With
the development in the middle of the twentieth century of medical technology
that was able to sustain life, which would otherwise be ended by natural
causes, legal doctrine and medical ethics drew on the doctrine of the necessity
of informed consent before treatment could be rendered to a patient.3 The
doctrine of informed consent recognized not only the right of the individual
to assent or refuse such treatment; but that when a terminal patient becomes
mentally incompetent or unconscious, family members of patients could
assert the right to have treatment withdrawn on the grounds that it merely
prolongs the dying process.4 Early cases of treatment dealt with withdrawal
2
DAVID F. KELLEY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE ETHICS 126–27 (Georgetown
University Press, 2d ed. 2013) (“The ethical distinction between mandatory and optional treatment has
been provided by the Catholic tradition in its centuries-old distinction between ordinary and extraordinary
means of preserving life, terms often used even in secular conversation and policies. The distinction goes
back at least to the sixteenth century, was included in the important work of Alphonse Liguori in the
eighteenth century, and was emphasized and made popular by the teaching of Pope Pius XII in the 1950’s
. . . . The more restrictive approach looked only to the burdens of treatment itself. A treatment was said to
be extraordinary if it was painful, caused great hardship, or was expensive.”).
3
KEVIN D. O’ROURKE & PHILIP J. BOYLE, MEDICAL ETHICS: SOURCES OF CATHOLIC TEACHINGS
212–13 (Georgetown University Press, 4th ed. 2011) (“[T]he doctor, as a private person, cannot take any
measure or try any intervention without the consent of the patient.”).
4
Id. at 265 (“In general [the doctor] can take action only if the patient explicitly or implicitly, directly
or indirectly, gives him permission. The technique of resuscitation which concerns us here does not contain
anything immoral in itself. Therefore the patient, if they were capable of making a personal decision, could
lawfully use it and, consequently, give the doctor permission to use it. On the other hand, since these forms
of treatment go beyond the ordinary means to which one is bound, it cannot be held that there is an
obligation to use them nor, consequently, that one is bound to give the doctor permission to use them. . . .
The rights and duties of the family depend in general upon the presumed will of the unconscious patient if
he is of age and ‘sui juris.’ Where the proper and independent duty of the family is concerned, they are
usually bound only to the use of ordinary means. Consequently, if it appears that the attempt at resuscitation
constitutes in reality a burden for the family that one cannot in all conscience impose it upon them, they
can lawfully insist that the doctor should discontinue these attempts, and the doctor can lawfully comply.”).
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of mechanical support such as ventilators.5 Roman Catholic teaching,
medical ethics, and legal rulings were generally in agreement on the
appropriateness of withdrawal of such “extraordinary” treatment.6 Requests
to discontinue provision of artificial nutrition and hydration in the case of
terminally ill patients, which was also viewed as medical treatment that could
be refused, were initially viewed as supported by Catholic teaching, and
recognized as legitimate by medical ethicists and by law courts.7 The general
rule developed that recognized the right of a competent person to refuse such
life prolonging treatment, and to indicate in an advance directive that such
treatment not be provided if the patient was incompetent when diagnosed with
a terminal illness.8
In 1972, the condition PVS was recognized and clinical criteria
developed for diagnosis of the condition.9 Some theologians, joining many
medical ethicists and legal authorities, viewed this condition when it is
properly diagnosed as equivalent to a terminal condition for purposes of
allowing removal of life support or medical treatment, including ANH.10
Other theologians and Church authorities developed the view that the patient
in PVS is a person who, while unconscious, is not suffering from a terminal
illness which will otherwise cause death, and who must be provided ordinary
care which includes nutrition and hydration, even if it is provided by artificial
or mechanical means.11 This Article will examine the developing Catholic
teaching on whether there is a moral obligation to provide ANH to the PVS
5
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); see William J. Curran, Defining Appropriate Medical
Care: Providing Nutrients and Hydration for the Dying, in BIOETHICS 1, 209 (Thomas A. Shannon ed., 3d
ed. 1987) (“The New Jersey Supreme Court first attained national prominence in medicolegal issues of
obligation to critically ill patients in the Karen Ann Quinlan case. The high court in New Jersey issued an
eminently sensible opinion in that case, allowing the patient’s guardian, her father, to use his discretion in
removal of life support [a respirator] from his daughter, who was then irreversibly comatose.”).
6
In re Storar, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388, 393 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) rev'd 420 N.E.2d. 64 (N.Y. 1981).
7
Atlanta Archdiocese, Georgia Man Asks to Turn Off Life-Supporting Ventilator, ORIGINS 273, 273–
79 (1989) (discussing the case of a quadriplegic patient sustained on a ventilator who had “no control over
his person and receive[d] no enjoyment out of life” and who requested removal of the ventilator. The
Archdiocese concluded that “[t]he consensus of legal, theological and moralistic authorities, however,
support[ed] Mr. McAfee’s right to refuse further treatment by ventilator, and such refusal in this case would
not be the equivalent of suicide. Rather, it can be considered as Mr. McAfee’s acceptance of his condition,
his wish to avoid the application of a medical procedure disproportionate to the expected results and his
desire not to impose excessive expense on his family and the community at large.”).
8
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) finding that competent
patients have a common law and constitutional right to refuse treatment); see also In re Gardner, 534 A.2d
947, 957 (Me. 1987) (suggesting that an advance directive is essentially an equivalent with anticipating
informed consent).
9
The term PVS was coined in 1972 by Jennet and Plum to describe those patients who exhibited
brain stem functions but a total absence of activity in the cerebral context. Unlike the eyes-closed, sleep
like unconsciousness typically seen with comatose patients, those in a PVS experience alternate eyes-open
and eyes closed unconsciousness. “Awake but not aware” is how it can be described. See Bryan Jennet &
Fred Plum, Persistent Vegetative State After Brain Damage: A Syndrome in Search of a Name, in THE
LANCET 734, 734–37 (1972).
10
Richard A. McCormick, Caring or Starving? The Case of Claire Conroy, in 152 AMERICA 265,
269–73 (1985).
11
William E. May et al., Feeding and Hydrating the Permanently Unconscious and other Vulnerable
Persons, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 203, 203–10 (1987).
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patient.
II. CONSENSUS LEGAL AND MEDICAL VIEW ON WITHHOLDING AND
WITHDRAWAL OF ANH FROM PERSON DIAGNOSED AS PVS
The case of Cruzan v. Director decided in 1990 was the first end-oflife case decided by the United States Supreme Court.12 The patient who was
the subject in the case was a woman who had lapsed into a persistent,
vegetative state as a result of serious injuries suffered in an automobile
accident seven years earlier.13 The Court affirmed the state supreme court’s
opinion, which held that artificial nutrition and hydration could not be
withdrawn from a woman in a PVS who was not terminally ill unless there
was proof of clear and convincing evidence that she had authorized such
termination prior to losing decision-making capacity.14 Despite upholding the
Missouri standards of proof for determining an incompetent patient’s prior
statements about life sustaining treatment, the Court’s opinion reflected the
established consensus that a patient, including an incompetent patient, had the
right to forgo life-sustaining treatment, including withholding and withdrawal
of ANH.15
Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court adopted the assumption
that provision of ANH constituted medical treatment when considering the
scope of withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent patient:
Petitioners insist that under the general holding of our cases,
the forced administration of life-sustaining medical
treatment, and even of artificially delivered food and water
essential to life, would implicate a competent person’s liberty
interest [in refusing treatment]. . . . [F]or purposes of this
case, we assume that the United States Constitution would
grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.
Petitioners go on to assert that an incompetent person should
possess the same right in this respect as is possessed by a
competent person.16
A majority of the Justices in Cruzan (the three dissenters and concurring
Justices O’Connor and Scalia) went farther and clearly adopted the view that
nutrition and hydration was simply one form of medical care.17 Justice
Brennan adopted the view of ANH that has become the dominant view in
12

See generally Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Id. at 265–66.
14
See id. at 284–85; Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d. 408, 426 (Mo. 1988).
15
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16
Id. at 279 (majority opinion).
17
Id. at 287, 302, 304, 307, 331 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
13
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American law:
The artificial delivery of nutrition and hydration is
undoubtedly medical treatment. The technique to which
Nancy Cruzan is subject -- artificial feeding through a
gastronomy tube -- involves a tube implanted surgically into
her stomach through incisions in her abdominal wall. It may
obstruct the intestinal tract, erode and pierce the stomach
wall, or cause leakage of the stomach’s contents into the
abdominal cavity. . . . The tube can cause pneumonia from
reflux of the stomach’s contents into the lung. . . . Typically,
and in this case, commercially prepared formulas are used,
rather than fresh food. . . . The type of formula and method
of administration must be experimented with to avoid
gastrointestinal problems. The patient must be monitored
daily by medical personnel as to weight, fluid intake, and
fluid output; blood tests must be done weekly.
Artificial delivery of food and water is regarded as medical
treatment by the medical profession and the Federal
Government. . . . The Federal Government permits the cost
of the medical devices and formulas used in enteral feeding
to be reimbursed under Medicare. The formulas are regulated
by the federal Food and Drug Administration as “medical
foods,” and the feeding tubes are regulated as medical
devices[] . . . .18
The consensus view among medical authorities is that there is no
distinction between nutrition and hydration and other forms of medical
treatment.19 The American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs has declared that: “Life-sustaining treatment may include, but
is not limited to, . . . artificial nutrition and hydration.”20 Similarly, the courts
have concluded that termination of ANH is no different from termination of
other forms of mechanical support.21
The question arises, when may a patient refuse treatment, and if a
patient becomes incompetent when does that patient become eligible to have
life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn in accordance with
18

Id. at 307–08 (internal citations omitted).
Code of Medical Ethics: Opinion 2.20 - Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical
Treatment, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code
-medical-ethics/opinion220.page? (last visited Mar. 13, 2015); see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,
1235–37 (N.J. 1985) (discussing the risks associated with artificial hydration and nutrition).
20
AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 19.
21
In re Conroy, 468 A.2d at 1236 (“Analytically, artificial feeding by means of a nasogastric tube or
intravenous infusion can be seen as equivalent to artificial breathing by means of a respirator. Both prolong
life through mechanical means when the body is no longer able to perform a vital bodily function on its
own.”).
19
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appropriate surrogate decision-making rules such as established by statutes
providing for living wills? A competent patient has the right to refuse any
medical treatment subject to the state’s interest in preserving life and
preventing suicide which limits such claim when based on a constitutional
right to privacy or protected liberty interest.22 For example, in In re Conroy,
the New Jersey Supreme Court rested the right of a patient to refuse treatment
on common law principles of battery, without any reference to constitutional
claims.23 The United States Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg,
addressing the claim to physician aid in dying, reasoned that the right to refuse
treatment whose existence the Court had assumed in Cruzan was based on
“the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery[] . . . .”24
The majority of state courts recognizing a right to refuse lifesustaining treatment have found that right in state common law, usually in the
law of battery and the related law of informed consent, applied even after the
patient has lost the capacity to make medical decisions.25 In principle, neither
the type of treatment at issue in an end-of-life-cases, nor the diagnosis of the
patient is determinative of whether treatment may be withheld or withdrawn.26
Cases involving withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment have
turned on the facts of the case.27 Establishing the presence of a terminal
illness,28 or an undue burden in the administration of treatment,29 or the futility
of treatment,30 are factual conditions which have established the eligibility of
an incompetent patient for the withholding or withdrawal of treatment.
A patient may direct future treatment by executing a durable power
of attorney for health care which provides authority appointing a surrogate
decision-maker and specifying the conditions and kinds of treatment to be
administered or to be withheld.31 A widely used advance directive is the living

22

See id. at 1235.
Id. at 1221–22.
24
Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997).
25
Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269–70 (1990). Chief Justice Rehnquist
recognizes “[t]he informed consent doctrine has become firmly entrenched in American tort law. . . . The
logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not to
consent, that is, to refuse treatment.” Id. With the establishment of a common law right to refuse treatment
it is not necessary to determine whether the right is also confirmed by statute or by the constitution of the
United States or by a state constitution. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
26
See, e.g., Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 637 (Mass. 1986); In re Jobes,
529 A.2d 434, 446 (N.J. 1987).
27
See, e.g., In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 135–39 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); Carothers v. Dep’t of
Insts., Grand Junction Reg’l Ctr., 845 P.2d 1179, 1181 (Colo. 1993).
28
See UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 240 (1987) (establishing that a living
will refusing treatment becomes operative when it is communicated to the attending physician and that
patient is both terminally ill and incompetent).
29
See e.g., In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d at 135–36.
30
See, e.g., Carothers, 845 P.2d at 1181.
31
David A. Powers, Advance Medical Directives: The Case for the Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 437, 449 (1987).
23
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will, which usually applies to life sustaining treatment.32 Living wills
generally apply in the case of terminal illness.33 The Uniform Right of the
Terminally Ill Act applies in the case of “terminal condition,” which is
defined as a condition that is “incurable and irreversible.”34 Some states have
specifically provided that living wills apply to some non-terminal conditions
such as “irreversible coma” or “persistent vegetative state” as well as to
terminal conditions.35
Judicial treatment of PVS as a condition qualifying a patient for
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment generally involves a
recognition of the condition as equivalent to terminal illness.36 Both of the
landmark cases involving Karen Quinlan37 and Nancy Cruzan38 involved
patients who were in PVS when they came to the courts. The legal and
medical consensus view has been that a person in a PVS has no chance of
return to a cognitive state although the body of the patient can be maintained,
often without the use of a ventilator, for many years and sometimes for
decades.39 However, such persons often require the assistance of ANH.
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens in his dissent in Cruzan stated that every court
that had considered a request to terminate life-sustaining treatment for a
person in a PVS had approved withdrawal of ANH.40
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in In re Gardner provided a
good example of contemporary judicial consideration of requests to
discontinue provision of ANH to a person in a PVS.41 The court found that
the patient’s mother, acting as his guardian, had the authority to order the
removal of a feeding tube as well as other life-sustaining procedures from the
patient who was “in a chronic and persistent vegetative state without hope of
regaining any cognitive or voluntary bodily functions by any known or
anticipated medical procedure.”42 The court found “no reason not to respect
Gardener’s personal decision and allow the discontinuation of life-sustaining

32
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(4) (West 2001); see generally Susan R. Martyn & Lynn
Balshone Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Terminally Ill: The Living Will and Durable
Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779, 787 (1984).
33
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(8) (West 2006).
34
UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 615 (1987).
35
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1.A.(3)(b) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4503(1)(b) (West
2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(9) (West 2009).
36
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 349 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); In
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (N.J. 1976).
37
Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 652–53. Quinlan’s cognitive abilities were irreversibly lost due to the
destruction of the cognitive part of her brain according to criteria established by the Ad Hoc Committee of
the Harvard Medical School. Id. at 655.
38
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266–68 (majority opinion). The Court observed that Cruzan was “in what is
commonly referred to as a [PVS]: generally, a condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but
evinces no indications of significant cognitive function.” Id. at 266.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 348–49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41
In re Gardener, 534 A.2d 947, 948 (Me. 1987).
42
Id. at 949, 956.
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treatment.”43 The court went on to reason that:
A different result is not warranted simply because the lifesustaining procedure at issue involves the artificial provision
of nutrition and hydration. There is no meaningful ground for
distinguishing the artificial provision of nutrition and
hydration through an NG tube from other forms of lifesustaining procedures such as a respirator, which provides
another essential of life, oxygen, or a dialysis machine, which
attends to another essential of life, waste disposal.44
The consensus view on the appropriateness of withdrawal of nutrition
and hydration for a person in a PVS has been based largely on the factual
finding that for the patient, the prognosis for return to a cognitive or sapient
state is thought to be virtually impossible.45 There are, however, reports in
medical literature discussing patients with a PVS diagnosis who have
occasionally recovered some level of consciousness and limited functioning
typically occurring, if at all, within four months and rarely after one year.46
These reports must be considered against a background of uncertainty among
physicians making a PVS diagnosis and the confusion of PVS with any
prolonged state of unconsciousness.47
This Article will now focus on the challenge developed by the Roman
Catholic Magisterium to the consensus legal understanding of the
appropriateness of withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from persons in
PVS. This challenge is in no way based on questions about the accuracy of
PVS diagnosis. Rather, this involves a fundamental challenge to the
understanding of PVS as a medical condition equivalent to terminal illness.
Instead, the position of the Roman Catholic Church is that PVS should be
understood as a disability that in no way justifies withholding needed nutrition
and hydration.48 Just as fundamentally, the Church’s position is that
mechanical provision of nutrition and hydration in the case of the PVS patient
does not involve administration of medical care but provision of life-giving
sustenance.49 The Church’s view is that the PVS patient is a disabled person
who is entitled to provision of basic care including ANH, and not the
43

Id. at 954.
Id.
See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981); In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 740
(Wash. 1983).
46
Keith Andrews, Recovery of Patients After Four Months or More in the Persistent Vegetative State,
306 BRIT. MED. J. 1597, 1597 (1993); Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1499, 1505 (1994); D.J. Wilkinson et al., Functional Neuroimaging and Withdrawal of LifeSustaining Treatment From Vegetative Patients, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 508, 508 (2008).
47
See Martin M Monti et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Consciousness, 362
NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 580 (2010) (discussing the difficulties in diagnosis).
48
Thomas A. Shannon & James J. Walter, Assisted Nutrition and Hydration and the Catholic
Tradition, 66 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 651, 653 (2005).
49
See generally id.
44
45
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equivalent of a terminal patient from whom life-support treatment can be
withdrawn.50
III. CATHOLIC TRADITION ON REFUSAL OF TREATMENT
The development of medicine as a science and the establishment of
theological faculties in the sixteenth century, especially at the University of
Salamanca in Spain, produced the occasion for the development of standards
in the Roman Catholic tradition for submitting to and refusing medicines and
treatment that could prolong life.51 Drawing on the writings of Thomas
Aquinas, the Dominican theologian Francisco de Vitoria identified the basic
principles of Catholic medical ethics as rooted in fundamental theological
truths, including (1) Human life is a gift of God which is a “great good but
not an absolute good[;]” (2) A person “should use all fitting means to prolong
life[;]” however, if the means of treatment “impose an excessive burden[]”
they are not fitting and need not be used; (3) The ultimate good is God to
whom “[a]ll human acts should be ordered[;]” and (4) The person should “be
interested in a good life[]” and not a prolonged life.52
Francisco de Vitoria, and the theologians who followed him, did not
attempt to identify specific treatments a person was obliged to submit to in
order to preserve life. However, a significant formulation of a standard to
evaluate treatment was proposed in 1595 by Domingo Bañez who developed
the distinction between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” means which could be
used to determine whether a person was required to accept treatments which
were proportionate to the patient’s condition.53 According to these criteria,
one is not obligated to use a treatment that is unduly burdensome, or does not
provide a substantial benefit to the patient, or is too costly.54 While new
methods of treatment continued to be developed, there remained a general
agreement that the foundational principles established by the Salamancan
Theologians were valid.55
The first Magisterial teaching on the issue of medical treatment was

50
UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR
CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter USCCB].
In principle, there is an obligation to provide patients with food and water, including medically assisted
nutrition and hydration for those who cannot take food orally. This obligation extends to patients in chronic
and presumably irreversible conditions (e.g. the ‘persisted vegetative state’) who can reasonably be
expected to live indefinitely.”
Id. at 31.
51
Kevin D. O’Rourke, The Catholic Tradition on Foregoing Life Support, THE NAT’L CATHOLIC
BIOETHICS QUARTERLY 537, 538 (2005).
52
Id. at 538–39.
53
John J. Paris, The Catholic Tradition on the Use of Nutrition and Fluids, in BIRTH, SUFFERING, AND
DEATH 189, 199 (Kevin Wm. Wildes et.al. eds., 1992).
54
See O’Rourke, supra note 51, at 548–49.
55
Id. at 539.
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an address on “The Prolongation of Life” by Pope Pius XII in 1957.56 The
basic requirement established by this address was that one has the right and
duty to accept treatment necessary for the preservation of life and health.57
However, this general rule is limited by the recognition that one is not
obligated to submit to burdensome treatment.58 According to Pius XII:
“[N]ormally one is held to use only ordinary means—according to
circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture—that is to say, means
that do not involve any grave burden for oneself or another[;]” according to
the Pope, “[a] more strict obligation would be too burdensome for most men
and would render the attainment of the higher, more important good too
difficult.”59 The Pope concluded that one’s physical life should be
subordinated to spiritual ends.
An authoritative statement on the issue of appropriate decisions about
treatment took the form of the Declaration on Euthanasia (the “Declaration”)
issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1980.60 The
Declaration drew a distinction between ordinary versus extraordinary care, a
distinction that it equated to proportionate versus disproportionate care.61
According to the Declaration, care may be stopped or withdrawn when the
results fall short of reasonable expectations of contribution to the cure or
health of the patient.62 Moreover, treatment could be refused or withheld
when the costs of treatment were disproportionate to the benefits produced by
the treatment, or when the strain or pain suffered by the patient is out of
proportion to the benefits of treatment to the patient:
Such a refusal is not the equivalent of suicide; on the
contrary, it should be considered as an acceptance of the
human condition, or a wish to avoid the application of a
medical procedure disproportionate to the results that can be
expected, or a desire not to impose excessive expense on the
family or the community.63
Special notice was taken in the Declaration of the terminal patient
who may refuse treatment that merely prolongs the dying process.64 Such a
patient, however, must be provided ordinary care.65 According to the
56
See generally Le Dr. Bruno Haid, The Prolongation of Life: An Address of Pope Pius XII to an
International Congress of Anesthesiologists, 4 THE POPE SPEAKS 393, 393 (1958).
57
Id. at 396–98.
58
Id. at 397.
59
Id. at 395–96.
60
Franjo Cardinal Seper, Declaration on Euthanasia, VATICAN CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE
OF THE FAITH 1, 10 (1980), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_c
faith_doc_19800505_euthanasia_en.html.
61
Id. at 8–10.
62
Id. at 9.
63
Id. at 9–10.
64
Id. at 4.
65
Id. at 10.
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Declaration:
When inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means
used, it is permitted in conscience to take the decision to
refuse forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious
and burdensome prolongation of life, so long as the normal
care due to the sick person in similar cases is not
interrupted.66
Again, no bright line is established distinguishing ordinary from
extraordinary medical treatment. The “normal care due to the sick person”
must always be accepted and provided.67 What constitutes ordinary medical
care “due to the sick person” would be subject to the determination whether
the benefits gained are greater than the burdens experienced by the patient.68
“Ordinary care,” which is sometimes “referred to as comfort care, palliative
care or nursing care[,]” can be distinguished from “ordinary medical care.”69
Ordinary care, which must be provided to all patients, includes “simpl[e]
health and hygiene measures, food and water, bathing, assistance with the
elimination of bodily waste, turning a patient in bed, keeping a patient [dry,
warm or cool as appropriate].”70
IV. DECONSTRUCTING THE CONSENSUS ON
DECISIONS TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
Modern medical technology has complicated the dying process.
Medical technology has developed machinery and drugs that forestall death.
In the past, infectious diseases and simple human debilitation led to death with
little opportunity for intervention. Increasingly, chronic diseases provide
occasion for intervention and use of medical technology that facilitates the
extension of a patient’s life, sometimes indefinitely.
At the same time, it has become possible to maintain the physical
functioning of a patient’s body, even though the patient has lost the capacity
for conscious awareness. These medical technological developments have
led to the development of legal rules and procedures for surrogate decision
making about the medical needs and treatment of unconscious and
incompetent patients.71 These include legal rules and procedures permitting
the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from noncompetent patients, including patients permanently unconscious.72
66

Id.
Id.
68
Id. at 9.
69
D. BRIAN SCARNECCHIA, BIOETHICS, LAW, AND HUMAN LIFE ISSUES 375 (2010).
70
Id.
71
In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015, 1020 (La. 1982) (suggesting that courts will assure that proper
decision making processes were followed and there was a reasonable and defensible decision made).
72
Id.
67
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The legal and medical ethical foundational values underlying the
legal rules and practices governing life-sustaining treatment decisions include
autonomy, dignity, and bodily indignity.73 These decisions are properly
controlled by the individual as a matter of actual choice, or by surrogates
using a process of substituted judgment determined by a patient’s former
communication of choice, or by decisions in the best interest of the patient.74
The early legal analysis and the development of principles by medical
ethicists have relied on a conceptual scheme that classified treatment in a
manner reflective of Roman Catholic teaching. Early cases in the
contemporary development of the law and ethics dealing with decisions
regarding life-sustaining treatment distinguished between “extraordinary”
treatment, which could be foregone at the patient’s or surrogate decisionmaker’s request, and “ordinary” treatment which was deemed mandatory in
all cases.75
This distinction has largely been abandoned in legal and medical
ethical discourse. Over time, it became clear that a treatment was classified
as “extraordinary” when it was new, scarce, costly, and “ordinary” when it
was more generally available and less costly.76 Perhaps most significant was
the fact, which was important in the Quinlan case, that a specific treatment
could be regarded: as “extraordinary” when applied to a terminal or bodily
compromised patient, and viewed as “ordinary” when provided to a patient
with a reasonable likelihood of recovery.77
Just as the Catholic classification shifted to capture the significance
of the contribution of a treatment to the health and well-being of the patient,
courts and medical ethicists began to refer to that treatment as “proportionate”
and “disproportionate.”78 This approach was specifically adopted by a
California appeals court, which reasoned:
Under this approach, proportionate treatment is that which[]
. . . has at least a reasonable chance of providing benefits to
the patient, which benefits outweigh the burdens attendant to
73
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 26 (1983) (“In its work on the ethical issues
in health care the Commission discussed the importance of three basic values: self-determination, wellbeing and equity.”); see also RAANAN GILLON, PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICS 164 (John Wiley & Sons
ed., 1990) (“[I]n their relationships with their patients doctors must remember that apart from any special
moral obligations they have the standard moral obligations that all of us have to each other: to respect each
other’s autonomy, not to harm each other (non-maleficence), to be just, and to benefit at least some others
(beneficence).”).
74
In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68 (N.Y. 1981).
75
In re Storar, 433 N.Y.S.2d. 388, 393 (Sup. Ct. 1980), rev’d 420 N.E.2d. 64 (N.Y. 1981) (“Medical
ethics currently permit and support the termination of extraordinary means of treatment on life support
systems where there is no hope of a cure and where this is the wish of the patient and his family.”).
76
See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (N.J. 1976).
77
Id. (“[U]se of the same respirator or like support could be considered ‘ordinary’ in the context of
the possibly curable patient but ‘extraordinary’ in the context of the forced sustaining by cardio-respiratory
process of an irreversibly doomed patient.”).
78
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol40/iss3/6

2016]

ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION

419

the treatment. . . . On the other hand, a treatment course which
is only minimally painful or intrusive may nonetheless be
considered disproportionate to the potential benefits if the
prognosis is virtually hopeless for any significant
improvement in condition.79
There is another distinction in law and medical ethics which gained
importance, that is the difference between an “affirmative act” intended to
cause a patient’s death, and an “omission” or a failure to intervene when a
patient’s life is threatened by disease or medical condition.80 In law and
medical ethics, affirmative acts are deemed killing, and failures to intervene
are viewed as allowing to die (allowing nature to take its course), rather than
as causing death.81 In law, withholding or withdrawing ANH will generally
be regarded as an “omission” which carries no legal liability absent conditions
establishing a duty to provide such care.82 However, Catholic teaching
condemns both an affirmative action or omission (such as denial of fluids or
food) intended to cause a person’s death in order for that suffering to be
eliminated.83
The ambiguity in this distinction between act and omission is
reflected in the situation where ANH is withdrawn. This was recognized, for
example, by the New Jersey Supreme Court:
The distinction is particularly nebulous, however, in the
context of decisions whether to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment. In a case like that of [the patient], for
example, would a physician who discontinued nasogastric
feeding be actively causing her death by removing her
primary source of nutrients; or would he merely be omitting
to continue the artificial form of treatment, thus passively
allowing her medical condition, which includes her inability
to swallow, to take its natural course?84
The Court concluded:
Whether necessary treatment is withheld at the outset or
withdrawn later on, the consequence -- the patient’s death -is the same. Moreover, from a policy standpoint, it might well
be unwise to forbid persons from discontinuing a treatment
under circumstances in which the treatment could
permissibly be withheld. Such a rule could discourage
79
80
81
82
83
84
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families and doctors from even attempting certain types of
care and could thereby force them into hasty and premature
decisions to allow a patient to die.85
Perhaps one of the most significant divisions between law/medical
ethics and Catholic moral teaching has been their different conclusions on the
issue of foregoing medical treatment as contrasted with withholding or
withdrawal of ANH. The early legal decisions on forgoing life-sustaining
treatment initially involved treatment and machines used in intensive care,
such as respirators in the Quinlan case.86 In these cases, there was general
agreement between legal authorities, professional medical ethicists, and
Catholic moral theologians.87 Over time, courts as well as medical ethicists
were asked to decide whether it was permissible to forgo ANH (i.e., hydration
and nutrition delivered by intravenous lines, nasogastric tubes, or gastrostomy
tubes).88 Some medical ethicists maintained that medically delivered ANH
was basic comfort care similar to providing basic hygiene, which was
mandatory for all patients.89 A distinction was drawn between invasive and
high technology interventions, which were burdensome and could be
withdrawn, and simple mechanisms such as intravenous lines facilitating
provision of fluids and nutrients.90 However, discontinuing provision of
nutrition and hydration (an omission) was seen by some as equivalent to
providing a lethal injection of drugs (commission) because just as a lethal
drug causes death, starvation and dehydration causes death independent of
any underlying illness or injury.91
Beginning in the early 1980s, courts in the United States began
holding that withholding or withdrawing hydration and nutritional support
85

Id.
See generally In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
87
Id. at 656.
88
See generally Mary Ann Garvey, Withdrawal of Nutrition and Hydration from an Incompetent
Patient: Legal Developments Leading to Cruzan, 23 J. HEALTH L. 225, 225 (1990).
89
See Ronald Hamel & Michael Panicola, Must We Preserve Life?, in ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND
HYDRATION AND THE PERMANENTLY UNCONSCIOUS PATIENT 79, 82 (Georgetown University Press 2007)
(“Some of those attempting to revise the tradition define artificial nutrition and hydration as care, basic
care or minimal measures for sustaining life and then assert that providing care is always morally
obligatory. For example, in its 1981 document, “Questions of Ethics Regarding the Fatally Ill and Dying,”
the Pontifical Council on Health Affairs stated: “[T]here remains the strict obligation to apply under all
circumstances those therapeutic measures which are called ‘minimal’: that is, those which are normally
and customarily used for the maintenance of life (alimentation, blood transfusions, injections, etc.). To
interrupt these minimal measures would, in practice, be equivalent to wishing to put an end to the patient’s
life’ . . . .”).
90
Richard P. Becker, Hypodermoclysis and Proctoclysis as Basic Care, THE NAT’L CATHOLIC
BIOETHICS QUARTERLY 649, 649–59 (2011). The author suggests that while enteral nutrition and
hydration (involving insertion of a tube into the stomach or the intestines) may be mandatory under the
changed guidelines, parenteral nutrition given by an IV directly into the bloodstream, thus bypassing the
gastric tract, is not. Id.
91
Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d. 626, 641 (Mass. 1986) (Nolan, J., dissenting).
With withdrawal of a feeding tube from a permanently unconscious patient, “the cause of death would not
be some underlying physical disability like kidney failure or the withdrawal of some highly invasive
medical treatment, but the unnatural cessation of feeding and hydration.” Id.
86
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would be regarded as the same as foregoing the use of mechanical life
support.92 For example, the California appellate court, cited earlier in this
Article, reasoned that: “Medical procedures to provide nutrition and hydration
are more similar to other medical procedures than to typical human ways of
providing nutrition and hydration. Their benefits and burdens sought [sic] to
be evaluated in the same manner as any other medical procedure.”93
Courts and medical ethicists also rejected the argument that foregoing
ANH was an independent cause of death. One medical ethicist reasoned:
“Many medical tools, e.g., respirators, antibiotics, and nasogastric tubes,
constitute special interventions necessary to preserve some patients’ lives
because their underlying conditions have created needs for assistance in
breathing and eating or a susceptibility to infection.”94 While there is concern
that withholding ANH will cause discomfort and pain on the part of the
patient, clinical reports allay the concern.95 In the alternative, appropriate
medication can eliminate any such pain.96
In a book called Birth, Suffering, and Death, an article entitled, The
Catholic Tradition on the Use of Nutrition and Fluids, by John Paris and
Richard McCormick, both Jesuits writing on medical ethics argued that there
was a significant departure from the accepted consensus between the
legal/medical ethical and Catholic moral teaching on ANH in the arguments
set out in the amicus brief by the New Jersey Catholic Conference in the New
Jersey case In re Jobes.97 This case involved a 31-year-old woman who was
severely brain damaged, but not terminally ill and whose family requested the
removal of her feeding tube.98 The Conference’s purpose was to set out
Catholic teaching on provision of ANH in order to influence the court and
assist the development of law and medical ethics: “The conference has a keen
interest in the case at hand particularly since the disciplines of theology, law
and medicine intersect here; hence it hopes that the moral and philosophical
insights of Catholic ethical teaching may be helpful to the court . . . .”99 The
New Jersey Catholic Conference argued that there was a distinction between
burdensome mechanized treatment that could be withdrawn from a terminally
ill patient, and ANH provided to a severely brain injured, but not terminal
patient.100 The Conference maintained the ANH was not “medical treatment”
92
See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (comparing
administration via mechanical devices to medication and nourishment).
93
Id.
94
Rebecca S. Dresser & Eugene V. Boisaubin, Ethics, Law and Nutritional Support, 145 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 122, 122–24 (1985).
95
Louise A. Printz, Terminal Dehydration, a Compassionate Treatment, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 691, 700 (1992).
96
John E. Ruark et al., Initiating and Withdrawing Life Support, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 25, 28 (1988).
97
Paris, supra note 53, at 192.
98
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 437 (N.J. 1987).
99
William F. Bolan, Providing Food and Fluids to Severely Brain Damage Patients, in 16 ORIGINS
582, 582–84 (1987).
100
See generally id.
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but “ordinary care” whose provision was required. According to the brief:
The conference maintains that nutrition and hydration, being
basic to human life, are aspects of normal care, which are not
excessively burdensome, that should always be provided to a
patient. Nutrition and hydration are clearly distinguished
from medical treatment. Medical treatment is aimed at curing
a disease. Nutrition and hydration are directed at sustaining
life. Medical treatment is therapeutic; nutrition and hydration
are not, because they will not cure any disease. For that
fundamental reason we insist that nutrition and hydration
must always be maintained.101
The Conference argued that the intentional withdrawal of ANH
involves an intent to cause the death of the patient, since the withdrawal of
ANH will cause death without regard to the underlying illness or injury.102
The brief argued:
A person who withdraws these ordinary means to preserve
life is instrumental in bringing about the death of the patient.
When the patient dies, death does not come from the original
disease. The patient dies of starvation. When this is done with
the intention to end or shorten the life of the patient, it is
intentional euthanasia.103
The Court’s opinion In re Jobes gave no apparent consideration to
the argument of the Conference that ANH is different from other lifesustaining treatments. In a footnote, the Court reports that: “Two medical
ethicists who testified in this case disagreed over whether there is a
meaningful distinction between withdrawing nasogastric tubes and other life
sustaining medical treatment like respirators[;]” the Court summarily
responds: “[W]e reject such a distinction.”104
The most significant opinion establishing the authority of a surrogate
to withdraw ANH from a PVS patient was delivered by the United States
Supreme Court in the Cruzan case in 1990.105 This case involved the petition
of the parents of a patient requesting “the withdrawal of their daughter’s
artificial feeding and hydration equipment after it became [clear] that she had
virtually no chance of recovering her cognitive faculties[]” after suffering
severe injuries sustained in an automobile accident.106 Justice O’Connor
succinctly stated the principle in the case relevant to this discussion: “[A]
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 583.
Id.
Id.
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 n.9 (N.J. 1987).
Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
Id. at 265.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol40/iss3/6

2016]

ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION

423

protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from our own prior decisions, and that the refusal of artificially
delivered food and water is encompassed within that liberty interest.”107
The United States Catholic Conference again communicated its
opposition to having withdrawal of ANH treated the same as mechanized life
prolonging treatment in an amicus brief in the Cruzan case.108 The brief
stated: “The conference’s considered judgment . . . is that ‘the law should
establish a strong presumption in favor of their use,’ because ‘food and water
are necessities of life for all human beings and can generally be provided
without the risks and burdens of more aggressive means for sustaining
life.’”109 The brief went on to suggest that denying fluids and food to a PVS
patient was in fact discrimination against a disabled person: “Recognizing that
‘negative judgments about the ‘quality of life’ of unconscious or otherwise
disabled patients have led some in our society to propose withholding
nourishment precisely in order to end these patients’ lives,’ the bishops urge
that society ‘take special care to protect against such discrimination.’”110
In its opinion in the Cruzan case, the United States Supreme Court
remanded the case to the lower court for an evidentiary determination of the
patient’s preference regarding provision of ANH.111 The circuit judge found
a basis for determining the patient’s wishes regarding life-prolonging
treatment and allowed discontinuation of the liquid diet fed through a stomach
feeding tube.112 The patient died twelve days later.113 Bishop James McHugh
of Camden, New Jersey, provided an assessment of Catholic teaching at the
point of the Cruzan decision.114 He emphasized the difference between legal
rules governing decisions about medical treatment and the moral principle
that governs such decision-making.115 It is important to note that Bishop
McHugh regarded the Church’s teaching at the time of the Cruzan decision
to be open to conflicting views on the issue of provision of ANH to PVS
patients.116 In the next section of this Article, the resolution of these differing
views will be traced as clarification of the standards for withdrawal of ANH
from a PVS patient that have been developed in pronouncements by different
offices in the Church.

107

Id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
USCC Brief in Nancy Cruzan Case, in 19 ORIGINS 345, 345 (1989).
Id.
110
Id.
111
Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
112
Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
27, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/27/us/nancy-cruzan-dies-outlived-by-a-debate-over-the-righ
t-to-die.html.
113
See id.
114
See generally Bishop James T. McHugh, Statement after Nancy Cruzan’s Death, in 20 ORIGINS
518, 518 (1991).
115
See generally id.
116
Id. at 519.
108
109
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Bishop McHugh began his analysis by observing that a patient in a
coma or PVS is neither “brain-dead” nor in the dying process.117 These
patients are not able to take food and water in the usual way, so they are
provided nourishment and fluid through a mechanical process. Bishop
McHugh stated: “The problem is that at the present time we know that a PVS
patient is living, is brain-damaged and disabled, but given nourishment and
liquids and nursing care, such a patient may live for many years.”118 It is at
this point that Bishop McHugh recognized the existence of conflicting views
in Catholic ethical thinking on the provision of ANH to PVS patients at the
time of the Cruzan case:
Among Catholics, the issue seems to come down to two
different approaches and two different conclusions. The first
approach sees the PVS patient as incapable of thought or
ability to respond to his or her environment and considers this
absence of cognition and affection as an inability to exercise
one’s spiritual faculties and possibly a danger to one’s overall
spiritual [growth], that is, union with God. Furthermore,
since the brain damage seems to prevent normal swallowing,
this approach holds that the person is in fact already dying
from the inability to swallow. A number of Catholics who
hold this position agreed with withdrawing nutrition and
hydration from Nancy Cruzan and other similar patients.119
Bishop McHugh himself agreed with the alternative view, which has
since been adopted by a significant segment of the Magisterium:
The second approach sees the PVS patient as living but as
seriously disabled. Food and water does not cure the PVS
patient; it maintains life. It does not cause suffering for the
patient nor is it considered exceptional or experimental
medical technology. If the nutrition is discontinued then the
patient will die because a new cause of death has been
introduced, [lack of nourishment or starvation].120
V. DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC TEACHING ON
WITHDRAWAL OF ANH FROM THE PVS PATIENT
This section of this Article will examine the development over the
last 50 years of the teaching of the Magisterium of the Roman Catholic
Church on the subject of providing nutrition and hydration to patients. This
117

Id. at 518.
Id.
Id. at 519.
120
Bishop James T. McHugh, Death and Dying Issues, ETERNAL WORLD TELEVISION NETWORK (Mar.
11, 1991), http://ewtn.com/library/BISHOPS/DEATHISS.HTM.
118
119
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review will show a steady development of teaching on the subject and reveal
that Pope John Paul II’s statement on the subject in 2004 was not a deviation
but an important step in developing authoritative guidance on provision of
ANH to PVS patients.
In 1981, the Pontifical Council of Health Affairs issued a statement
on “Question of Ethics Regarding the Fatally Ill and Dying.”121 This working
group report was in response to questions raised by hospital chaplains, doctors
and nurses about the Declaration. The working group, while acknowledging
the terminology “ordinary” and “extraordinary” care was somewhat
outmoded in scientific and medical practice, it remains indispensable in
theological analysis since once a measure is judged “extraordinary” from a
theological perspective there is no obligation to provide such treatment.122
This report is significant for its determination that provision of nourishment
to a patient is an obligatory minimal measure. The report states:
[T]here remains the strict obligation to apply under all
circumstances those therapeutic measures which are called
“minimal”: that is, those which are normally and customarily
used for the maintenance of life (alimentation, blood
transfusions, iniections [sic], etc.). To interrupt these
minimal measures would, in practice, be equivalent to
wishing to put an end to the patient’s life.123
The same conclusion was reached by the Pontifical Academy of
Science in 1985 by a working group on The Artificial Prolongation of Life
and the Determination of the Exact Moment of Death.124 This report was
drafted by an international group of doctors and scientists who met in Rome
in October 1985 at the invitation of the Pontifical Academy of Science.125 The
report’s principal premise is that treatment is required if there is a possibility
of recovery, but it may be interrupted if there is no benefit to the patient.126
However, the report concluded the ANH must be provided to the PVS patient
“[i]f the patient is in permanent coma, irreversible as far as it is possible to
predict, treatment is not required, but care, including feeding, must be
provided.”127
The issue of providing nutrition and hydration to the terminal patient
121
See generally Questions of Ethics Regarding the Fatally Ill and the Dying, THE PONTIFICAL
COUNCIL OF HEALTH AFFAIRS 1, 1–13 (June 27, 1981), http://www.academiavita.org/_pdf/magisterium/co
uncils/pontifical_council_cor_unum/fatally_ill_and_dying.pdf
122
Id. at 4.
123
Id. at 4–5. Alimentation is the process of affording nourishment.
124
Working Group on the Artificial Prolongation of Life and the Determination of the Exact Moment
of Death, THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 1, 113–14 (Oct. 19–21, 1985), http://www.casinapioiv.v
a/content/dam/accademia/pdf/sv60pas.pdf.
125
Id. at xii–xvi.
126
Id. at 114.
127
Id.
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was directly dealt with in The Charter for Health Care Workers (the
“Charter”) issued by the Pontifical Council for Pastoral Assistance to Health
Care workers and approved by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
in 1995.128 The Charter consists of directives based on papal statements and
authoritative texts published by various departments of the Roman Curia.129
These directives permit withdrawal of treatment that is burdensome or merely
prolonging life from a terminal patient.130 Ordinary treatment, however, must
be provided even to the terminal patient so long as it is not burdensome. The
issue of ANH is specifically addressed: “The administration of food and
liquids, even artificially, is part of the normal treatment always due to the
patient when this is not burdensome for him: their undue suspension could be
real and properly so-called euthanasia.”131
On March 10–17, 2004, the Pontifical Academy for Life and the
World Federation of Catholic Medical Associations met and issued a joint
statement on the vegetative state: “Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative
State: Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas.”132 This statement was
issued three days before Pope John Paul II’s allocution on the subject of ANH
and PVS patients. The joint statement provided an assessment of the
diagnosis of PVS, which was distinguished from other compromised mental
states such as coma and minimally conscious state.133 A vegetative state was
defined as “a condition marked by: a state of vigilance, some alternation of
sleep/wake cycles, absence of signs of awareness of self and surroundings,
lack of behavioral responses to stimuli from the environment, maintenance of
autonomic and other brain functions.”134 The statement reported that “VS
[vegetative state] patients do not require technological support in order to
maintain their vital functions[]” and cannot be considered terminal patients.135
The statement specifically addressed the issue of ANH and the PVS patient:
“VS [vegetative state] patients have the right to[] . . . basic care, including
hydration, nutrition, warming and personal hygiene[] . . . .”136 The
withholding of ANH from a PVS patient was condemned as ethically
impermissible: “The possible decision of withdrawing nutrition and
hydration, necessarily administered to VS patients in an assisted way, is
followed inevitably by the patient’s death as a direct consequence. Therefore,
128
See generally The Charter for Health Care Workers, THE PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR PASTORAL
ASSISTANCE TO HEALTH CARE WORKERS (1995), https://www.ewtn.com/library/CURIA/PCPAHEAL.H
TM.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
International Congress on “Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific Advances
and Ethical Dilemmas,” THE PONTIFICAL ACAD. FOR LIFE & WORLD FED’N OF CATHOLIC MED. ASS’NS
(Mar. 10–17, 2004), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/documents/rc_pont
-acd_life_doc_20040320_joint-statement-veget-state_en.html.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
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it has to be considered a genuine act of euthanasia by omission, which is
The statement does not discuss possible
morally unacceptable.”137
complicating factors that can arise in specific cases such as a particular
patient’s inability to assimilate nutrients or a danger to a particular patient
posed by the need to surgically insert a feeding tube.
Pope John Paul II’s allocution on Life-Sustaining Treatments and
Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas was delivered on
March 20, 2004, to the participants at the International Congress, which had
issued the joint statement on the vegetative state that was discussed above.138
It is this speech on which additional Magisterial statements by the
Congregation for Doctrine of the Faith and directives issued by the United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops are based. Pope John Paul II began by
affirming the traditional teaching that ordinary or proportionate means to
preserve life are morally obligatory, while extraordinary or disproportionately
burdensome means are not.139
The Pope then addressed the specific case of the PVS patient and the
provision of nutrition and hydration: “The sick person in a vegetative state,
awaiting recovery or a natural end, still has the right to basic health care
(nutrition, hydration, cleanliness, warmth, etc.), and to the prevention of
complications related to his confinement to bed.”140 The Pope stated from an
ethical point of view there is no distinction between mechanized or artificial
provision of nutrition and hydration and natural feeding: both constitute
ordinary and proportionate care. The Pope said:
I should like particularly to underline how the administration
of water and food, even when provided by artificial means,
always represents a natural means of preserving life, not a
medical act. Its use, furthermore, should be considered, in
principle, ordinary and proportionate, and as such morally
obligatory, insofar as and until it is seen to have attained its
proper finality, which in the present case consists in
providing nourishment to the patient and alleviation of his
suffering.141
The “in principle” language and the subsequent text indicate that
there may be occasions when withholding ANH from a patient would be
proper. Such situations are suggested within the statement such as when
137
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nutrients are no longer assimilated by the patient’s body or when surgery or
the operation of feeding machines threaten the patient’s life or otherwise
become disproportionately burdensome in relation to any benefit from
receiving nutrition or hydration.
It is arguable that the Pope’s address was meant to respond to the
diversity of opinion on the issue of providing ANH to the PVS patient, which
was noticed by Bishop McHugh in his comments on the Cruzan case.
Significantly, the Pope distinguished ANH from other medical treatment that
prolongs life, he concluded that there is a moral distinction, no matter whether
the law treats them the same, in the context of refusing treatment.142 In
addition to preserving life, the Pope maintained that providing ANH may
prevent suffering experienced from dehydration or starvation.143 However,
medical authorities maintain that such suffering, if it is experienced, can be
alleviated by administration of pain medication.144 The principal teaching set
down by the Pope is that provision of ANH to the PVS patient is ordinary
care, proportionate, and therefore morally obligatory.145
It is immoral to withhold or withdraw ANH from the PVS patient,
absent its failure to provide nourishment, or without a showing that it imposes
a disproportionate burden in a specific case, no matter how long the patient
has persevered in the vegetative state:
The evaluation of probabilities, founded on waning hopes for
recovery when the vegetative state is prolonged beyond a
year, cannot ethically justify the cessation or interruption of
minimal care for the patient, including nutrition and
hydration. Death by starvation or dehydration is, in fact, the
only possible outcome as a result of their withdrawal. In this
sense it ends up becoming, if done knowingly and willingly,
true and proper euthanasia by omission.146
The Pope’s allocution on ANH and the PVS patient gave rise to
arguments in support and in opposition by theologians, which will be
discussed in the next section of this Article. However, one critique that has
become less persuasive is that of John Paris, James Keenan, and Kenneth
Himes who argued in an article in Theological Studies that the allocution lacks
Magisterial authority.147 These authors concluded that it is a mistake to
attribute “magisterial authority to a speech that is inconsistent with the
142

Id.
Id.
144
Franklin G. Miller & Diane E. Meier, Voluntary Death: A Comparison of Terminal Dehydration
and Physician-Assisted Suicide, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 128, 559–62 (1998).
145
Pope John Paul II, supra note 138.
146
Id.
147
John J. Paris et al., Quaestio Disputata: Did John Paul II’s Allocution on Life-Sustaining Treatment
Revise Tradition?, 67 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 163, 163–68 (2006).
143

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol40/iss3/6

2016]

ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION

429

Church’s traditional position on end-of-life care. . . . [because] it is by official
doctrinal statements proclaimed to the universal Church—not by comments
made to private groups—that the Church teaches.”148 However, the
development of the Church’s teaching on ANH and the PVS patient has been
evolving as it has dealt with this very specific subject. Moreover, it is
significant that subsequent statements and adoption of standards by
institutions of the Magisterium give support to a claim of authority for the
position enunciated in Pope John Paul II’s speech on the subject of ANH and
the PVS patient.
On August 1, 2007, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
issued a response to a request from the U.S. Bishops for a statement whether
it is morally obligatory to provide ANH to a PVS patient, except when
nutrients and fluids cannot be assimilated by the patient, or cannot be
administered without causing significant discomfort to the patient.149 The
Congregation responded that it was morally obligatory to provide ANH to the
PVS patient:
The administration of food and water even by artificial means
is, in principle, an ordinary and proportionate means for
preserving life. It is therefore obligatory to the extent to
which, and for as long as, it is shown to accomplish its proper
finality, which is the hydration and nourishment of the
patient. In this way suffering and death by starvation and
dehydration are prevented.150
In a Commentary on nutrition and hydration provided with its
“Response,” the Congregation explained the benefit of ANH and the fact that
in it, ANH is not usually burdensome:
Patients in a “vegetative state” breathe spontaneously, digest
food naturally, carry on other metabolic functions, and are in
a stable situation. But they are not able to feed themselves. If
they are not provided artificially with food and liquids, they
will die, and the cause of their death will be neither an illness
nor the “vegetative state” itself, but solely starvation and
dehydration. At the same time, the artificial administration of
water and food generally does not impose a heavy burden
either on the patient or on his or her relatives. It does not
involve excessive expense[] . . . and is proportionate to
accomplishing its purpose, which is to keep the patient from
148
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dying of starvation and dehydration. It is not, nor is it meant
to be, a treatment that cures the patient, but is rather ordinary
care aimed at the preservation of life.151
The Congregation concluded its Commentary by identifying the
exceptions to the general rule of moral obligation to provide ANH to a PVS
patient.152 The first is the simple lack of equipment or materials necessary for
ANH; or it may simply be unavailable “in very remote places or in situations
of extreme poverty, the artificial provision of food and water may be
physically impossible[] . . . .”153 In particular cases, the patient may receive
no nutritional benefit from ANH: “[T]he possibility [is not] excluded that, due
to emerging complications, a patient may be unable to assimilate food and
liquids, so that their provision becomes altogether useless.”154 Finally, in a
specific case, the mechanics of ANH may be burdensome: “[T]he possibility
is not absolutely excluded that, in some rare cases, artificial nourishment and
hydration may be excessively burdensome for the patient or may cause
significant physical discomfort, for example resulting from complications in
the use of the means employed.”155
The sources and content of the moral guidance provided by the
Magisterium include the teachings of bishops.156 The United States Catholic
Conference of Bishops (“USCCB”) provides guidance for moral and ethical
questions for health care workers and institutions in the principles they have
set out in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Service.157 The current edition of Ethical and Religious Directives, approved
in November 2009, contains a revision of Directive 58, which has
incorporated the magisterial teaching of Pope John Paul II’s allocution and
the Congregation’s “Response” to questions on provision of ANH to PVS
patients.158 The principle that the provision of ANH to PVS patients is a moral
obligation is clearly set out:
In principle, there is an obligation to provide patients with
food and water, including medically assisted nutrition and
hydration for those who cannot take food orally. This
obligation extends to patients in chronic and presumably
irreversible conditions (e.g., the “persistent vegetative state”)
151
Commentary, OFFICES OF THE CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, http://www.vatic
an.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20070801_notacommento_en.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
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who can reasonably be expected to live indefinitely if given
such care.159
Drawing on Catholic principles that limit the obligation to provide
medical measures that can produce their intended effect and that are not
excessively burdensome or disproportionate, Directive 58 sets out with some
specificity when provisions of ANH to a PVS patient can become morally
optional:
Medically assisted nutrition and hydration become morally
optional when they cannot reasonably be expected to prolong
life or when they would be “excessively burdensome for the
patient or [would] cause significant physical discomfort, for
example resulting from complications in the use of the means
employed.” For instance, as a patient draws close to
inevitable death from an underlying progressive and fatal
condition, certain measures to provide nutrition and
hydration may become excessively burdensome and
therefore not obligatory in light of their very limited ability
to prolong life or provide comfort.160
One of the underlying premises not fully articulated in the directive
is the view that ANH is ordinary care and not a medical intervention whose
effect is prolonging life.161 Another premise is that while surgical procedures
may be needed to facilitate ANH, the actual provision of nourishment and
fluids is normal care and not a medical intervention being carried out to cure
illness or restore a patient to good health.162 There is a rejection of the
distinction between artificial feeding and natural or conventional eating.163
Finally, the view taken by the Church’s teaching is that the provision of
nutrition, which is necessary for sustaining life, is at issue, not cure for
illness.164
VI. ETHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL DEFENSE AND
CRITICISM OF MAGISTERIAL TEACHING ON THE
MORAL OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE ANH TO PVS PATIENTS
While the Congregation “Response” to certain questions and the
USCCB issuance of Directive 58 support and codify the position developed
in Pope John Paul II’s statement, there has been continuing dispute among
159
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theologians about the proper approach to ANH, particularly in the case of the
PVS patient. As one commentator has noted:
While the revision of directive 58 provides a clearer
articulation of the use of artificial nutrition and hydration,
indicating that its use is ordinary, proportionate, and
therefore, in principle, morally obligatory, it has not
diminished the intensity of debate among medical ethicists
[particularly moral theologians] on the issue.165
The basic differences among theologians involve both the nature of
ANH and the condition of the PVS patient. Those theologians who favor the
Magisterial view of the moral obligation, in principle, to provide ANH to the
PVS patient, view provision of ANH as ordinary care to be provided to PVS
patients out of respect for their personhood and their human dignity.166 Those
challenging the developing magisterial view regard provision of ANH
(particularly where mechanical means such as a surgically implanted feeding
tube is used) as medical treatment that can be withheld or withdrawn because
it is disproportionate treatment in view of its lack of benefit in improving the
health or medical condition of the PVS patient.167
A defense of the Magisterium’s teaching was provided by Donald
Henke, a professor of moral theology at Kenrick-Glennon Seminary in St.
Louis.168 Henke uses the term “persistent unconsciousness” rather than
“persistent vegetative state” because he maintains that the term “vegetative”
carries pejorative connotations.169 He also prefers the term “assisted” rather
than “artificial” when referring to ANH.170
Henke maintains the assertions that ANH is a medical treatment
rather than care reflects a strategy of legal advocates to bring ANH within the
category of “prolonged medical treatment,” which can be refused by a patient
or be withdrawn by a surrogate.171 According to Henke, deliberate linguistic
choices were meant to have legal significance:
[B]efore 1983, nutrition and hydration were merely food and
water and, more importantly, classified as an aspect of basic
165
Id. at 9; see also KELLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 200 (“There are a number of reasons why traditional
catholic teaching permitting the nonuse of feeding tubes for pus and other similar patients ought not to be
changed.”).
166
Travaline & Berg, supra note 161, at 10–12.
167
Donald E. Henke, Artificially Assisted Hydration and Nutrition From Karen Quinlan to Nancy
Cruzan to the Present: An Historical Analysis of the Decision to Provide or Withhold/Withdraw Sustenance
From PVS Patients in Catholic Moral Theology and Medical Practice in the United States 1, 234 (2004)
(unpublished D.Th. dissertation, Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis), http://www.revdonaldhenke.com/cla
sses/MTH_514/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20COMPLETEDISSERTATION01.pdf.
168
See generally Donald E. Henke, Persistent Unconsciousness and the Use of Assisted Nutrition and
Hydration: Medical and Moral Reflections, 78 THE LINACRE QUARTERLY 138, 138 (2011).
169
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nursing care. After 1983 [the year of Nancy Cruzan’s
automobile accident], once it became clear that, like Karen
Quinlan, the lives of unconscious patients could be
maintained if they received food and water, a shift took place
in medical thought and practice. From this point forward, by
medical and legal means, an attempt was made to reclassify
the delivery of assisted food and fluids as a medical treatment
and no longer an aspect of basic nursing care.172
Henke maintains that this shift in language involved a strategy to bring ANH
under the general rule permitting withholding or withdrawal of lifeprolonging medical treatment because
[b]asic nursing care is something that is normally provided to
all patients regardless of their physical condition, e.g., things
like good hygiene, a comfortable room temperature,
alleviating pressure points, and at one time, food and fluids.
Medical treatments, on the other hand, were interventions
that could be accepted or refused according to the desires of
the patient or surrogate.173
Henke observed that the most controversial aspect of the papal
allocution was the statement that food and fluids, even if assisted by artificial
means, are “an ordinary and proportionate means of preserving life.”174
Henke identified the underlying premise of the Pope’s declaration as the
principle of the Catholic moral tradition that holds that ordinary means of
preserving life are morally obligatory and this includes all medicine and
treatments “which offer a reasonable hope of benefit and which can be
obtained and used without [undue burden of] expense, pain, or other
inconvenience.”175
Ultimately, Henke bases his defense of the Magisterial teaching on
the moral obligation to provide ANH to the PVS patient on the value of human
life and the human dignity of the person:
[H]uman life, even in a persistently unconscious condition,
remains a gift from God; and it is not completely our own to
dispose of . . . the Church tries to uphold the dignity of the
human person and to model the type of health care that all
human beings deserve simply because they are human.176
Henke concludes:
172
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176
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The clarifications from the Vatican, and now the U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops on end-of-life care, charge
us to honor human life, particularly when it is most
vulnerable and to resist practices that, even if motivated by a
form of compassion, nevertheless intend to end the life of a
person whose life is judged to be devoid of sufficient
quality.177
Criticism of the Magisterium’s teaching on ANH and PVS patients,
particularly Pope John Paul II’s statement on the subject was the focus of an
article Reflections on the Papal Allocution Concerning Care For PVS
Patients, by Kevin O’Rourke, a bioethicist at the Stritch School of Medicine
at Loyola University, Chicago.178 O’Rourke maintained that provision of
ANH to a PVS patient does not benefit the patient because it preserves mere
biological life (a physical functioning alone) and does not restore the patient
to a state in which the person can pursue the higher goals of life which require
cognitive functioning.179 According to this view, ANH is futile in the case of
the PVS patient because it is ineffective in restoring the health of the patient,
and because it is disproportionately burdensome and therefore has no
benefit.180
O’Rourke maintained that the Papal Allocution was not an infallible
proclamation and it is appropriate to subject it to criticism.181 O’Rourke’s
view is that it was a “reformable statement” by a Church authority and his
critique is meant to identify those facts which are relevant to this “reformable
statement.”182 O’Rourke attempts to identify specific errors in the statement
that undermine its authority and conclusions. O’Rourke begins by
questioning the statement’s equating vegetative state (“VS”) with PVS. The
statement says that there basically is no difference in the diagnosis but only
“‘a prognostic judgment that recovery is statistically speaking more
difficult[,]’” in the case of a PVS diagnosis.183 On the contrary, O’Rourke
maintains that: “In fact, the transition from VS to PVS is based on more than
statistics. It is based upon a presumption that the condition of the patient is
irreversible, and this presumption is based upon neurological evidence.”184
O’Rourke goes on to challenge the Allocution’s assertion “that
decisions to remove life support should not be made on the basis of ‘quality
177
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of life’ ‘because the intrinsic value and personal dignity [of the person] does
not change, no matter what the circumstance[] . . . .’”185 O’Rourke maintains
that the Allocution confuses “quality of life,” which is intrinsic in all humans
with “quality of functioning” that can change and which is subject to
evaluation when making decisions about life prolonging treatment.186
O’Rourke cites the statement of Pope Pius XII discussing decisions on
whether or not to utilize or withhold life support, which the Pope said depends
on the “circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture.”187 Moreover,
O’Rourke notes that one of the sources quoted with approval in the Allocution
itself, the Pontifical Council “Cor Unum,” “referred to this analysis of
circumstances as judging ‘the quality of life[,]’” which is relevant for making
treatment decisions.188
O’Rourke challenges the basic assumption of the Allocution
including the assertion that there is some hope of benefit from the prolonging
of life for a patient in a PVS, even if it is unlikely that the patient will recover
consciousness.189 According to O’Rourke this claim is based on the premise
that life (biological life) is an “intrinsic good” or a “great benefit” or “that
human life is an incommensurable good” and there is always a possibility of
recovery no matter that there is a contrary medical judgment.190 O’Rourke
maintains that medical evidence has established that there is no reasonable
basis to believe there is a possibility of recovery after a professional diagnosis
of PVS: “In most cases of PVS, moral certitude that the patient will not
recover is possible . . . .”191 Finally, contrary to the suggestion in the
Allocution that withdrawal of ANH may cause pain in the PVS patient,
O’Rourke cites contemporary studies that show “removing [ANH] from
patients in PVS or prolonged coma does not cause pain.”192
O’Rourke’s criticism of the Allocution claims a theological basis in
the Thomastic anthropology of the human person. Thomas Aquinas makes a
distinction between human acts (actus humanus) and acts of man (actus
hominus).193 “Human acts are acts [involving] the intellect and will; acts of
man are bodily acts not [controlled] by the intellect and will[]” (these involve
mere “physiological . . . activity, such as circulation of the blood or
digestion.”).194 O’Rourke maintains that: “If a person does not have the ability
nor the potency to perform human acts now or in the future, then that person
185
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can no longer strive for the purpose of human life and it does not benefit the
person in this condition to have life prolonged.”195 O’Rourke argues that:
If it is morally certain that persons cannot and will not
perform [human] acts of this nature now or in the future, then
the moral imperative to prolong their lives no longer is
present. Hence, it is not “a great benefit” for the patient, for
the family nor for society, to prolong their lives.196
O’Rourke concludes: “[T]here is no moral obligation to prolong the life of
persons in vegetative state from which they most likely will not recover.”197
Jason Eberl in an article in the National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly
has undertaken a defense of O’Rourke from the charge that “non-utilization
of ANH for PVS patients fail to recognize ‘the patient’s inherit dignity as a
human being and his or her status as a child of God.’”198 Eberl concedes that
physical or bodily life is indeed an intrinsic good of the human person; but
while valuable in itself, it is instrumental to a higher spiritual good.199
Prolonging the bodily life of a PVS patient “interferes with a PVS patient’s
attainment of her ultimate good, since her soul cannot engage in the
purposeful human activity of understanding and loving God until it separates
from the body and enters a new mode of existence and intellection awaiting
the body’s resurrection.”200
Eberl supports O’Rourke’s view that the patient is a human person
whose life has inherent dignity, but whose life is no longer meaningful since
the person can no longer engage in purposeful human activity toward the
person’s ultimate end.201 Applying the Catholic ethical criteria recognizing
the distinctions between ordinary and extraordinary, proportionate and
disproportionate, benefit and burden, and futile and beneficial treatment,
Eberl concludes:
ANH for properly diagnosed PVS patients should be
typically construed as “extraordinary” treatment, due to its
inability to help [benefit] a patient to an embodied condition
in which she can engage in purposeful human acts toward her
ultimate end . . . ANH is futile, and its prevention of the soul’s
timely departure from its body so that the person may pursue
her ultimate end may be disproportionately burdensome.202
195
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VII. A CLOSE AND CAREFUL READING OF CURRENT
MAGISTERIAL TEACHING ON ANH FOR PVS PATIENTS
Some commentators such as Thomas Shannon and James Walter
maintain that the Papal Allocution on provision of ANH to PVS patients
involves a change or shift in Church teaching from a “presumption” to an
“obligation” to provide, in principle, ANH to the permanently unconscious
patient.203 A careful consideration of Church actions and pronouncements,
however, shows a shift from a not clearly defined position on this issue to a
more certain standard establishing a moral obligation in principle, to provide
PVS patients food and fluids by mechanical means.
For Catholic health care workers and institutions, the Congregation’s
Responses and the USCCB’s Directive 58 provide the primary texts for
considering the obligation to provide ANH to PVS patients. One commentary
has identified two significant canons of the present Code of Canon Law,
which are relevant for interpreting the Congregation’s Responses.204 Canon
18 provides that: “Laws which establish a penalty or restrict free exercise of
rights . . . are subject to strict interpretation[,]” and Canon 52 stipulates: “A
singular decree has force only in respect to the matters which it decides and
for the persons for whom it was given.”205 In this commentary the assertion
is made that: “[T]he application of the [Congregation’s] response, because it
limits the free exercise of rights, will only apply to a restricted number of
cases, specifically to patients with a firm diagnosis of PVS.”206 Directive 58,
however, has much greater breadth since it “extends to patients in chronic and
presumably irreversible conditions (e.g., the ‘persistent vegetative state’) who
can reasonably be expected to live indefinitely if given such care.”207
Perhaps the more significant language for determining the
Magisterium’s teaching is the phrase that begins the text of Directive 58. This
phrase “in principle” as used in the Directive means that there are exceptional
instances in which the provision of ANH are not obligatory. This reconciles
the rule establishing a moral obligation to provide ANH to the PVS patient
with the general ethical principles underlying Catholic moral teaching
including that one must accept and provide ordinary care that is not
disproportionate or excessively burdensome. The directive itself establishes
the general terms of the exceptions to the rule including (1) when ANH cannot
be expected to prolong life (e.g. when the patient’s body can no longer
assimilate nutrition); (2) when ANH would be excessively burdensome for
the patient (e.g. when the device used to deliver ANH interferes with the
203
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activity of the patient’s organs); or (3) when ANH causes significant physical
discomfort, (e.g. resulting from complications in the use of the mechanical
device delivering ANH).208
Perhaps the most important exception is when a PVS patient develops
a terminal illness, often considered to be a diagnosed condition likely to result
in the patient’s death within six weeks. Directive 58 specifically provides that
“as a patient draws close to inevitable death from an underlying progressive
and fatal condition, certain measures to provide nutrition and hydration may
become excessively burdensome and therefore not obligatory in light of their
very limited ability to prolong life or provide comfort.”209
One commentator has provided an example of the type of situation,
in the case of a dementia diagnosis where the burden of employing
mechanical means to effectuate ANH would be considered disproportionately
burdensome and not obligatory:
“[F]or example, a patient who is ninety-five years old, has a
severe heart disease and diabetes in addition to dementia, is
still able to eat by hand feeding to maintain [nutrition and]
hydration, yet is losing weight. In such a patient PEG tube
insertion could rightly be considered an extraordinary
measure and thus is not mandatory.”210
Similar considerations are likely to arise in cases involving a PVS
diagnosis. Directive 58 uses the terms “when [ANH] cannot reasonably be
expected to prolong life . . . .”211 The Congregation “Response” uses the
terms: not able “to accomplish its proper finality, which is the hydration and
nourishment of the patient.”212 Another case is presented by the commentator:
“If a patient is losing weight, has a PEG tube inserted, and continues to lose
weight, the PEG tube is not required.”213
The Magisterial teaching is clear: in principle, there is a moral
obligation to provide ANH to the PVS patient. However, to the extent that
the Magisterial teaching is captured in Directive 58, this does not mean that
life must be prolonged with unnecessary suffering. As a statement of
Magisterial teaching, this directive takes seriously both the recognition of the
human dignity of the PVS patient, and the obligation not to abandon the
severely mentally-compromised patient diagnosed with PVS.
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VIII. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF CATHOLIC TEACHING ON
PROVISION OF ARTIFICIAL (ASSISTED) NUTRITION AND HYDRATION
The issue of limits on withholding and withdrawal of artificial or
assisted nutrition and hydration developed principally in relation to PVS
patients. However, the issue of ANH increasingly is raised in relation to other
diagnostic conditions, not only those involving recognized terminal illness by
patients requiring mechanical support, but those involving loss of cognitive
capacity far short of PVS. There are, moreover, efforts by patient advocates
to take an even more aggressive attitude toward withholding nutrition and
hydration. It has been argued that even spoon feeding be withheld from those
with severe cognitive impairments.214 In a recent article in the New York
Times entitled Complexities of Choosing an End Game for Dementia the
author describes efforts of patients with Alzheimer’s disease to direct
withholding of the “ordinary means of nutrition and hydration[]” including
spoon feeding or ordinary provisions of liquids.215 The article reports that
“now ethicists, lawyers and older adults themselves had begun a quiet debate
about whether people who develop dementia can use VSED [voluntarily
stopping eating and drinking] to end their lives by including such instructions
in an advance directive.”216
It is, however, an opinion addressing the withholding of ANH from a
patient diagnosed with advanced Alzheimer’s disease, which provides the
most significant legal analysis of the significance of the teaching of the
Roman Catholic Magisterium condemning withholding of ANH.217 The
opinion of the New York Supreme Court for Monroe County, in In re Zornow,
considered the issue of withholding treatment from a Roman Catholic, ninetythree-year-old woman suffering from advanced Alzheimer’s.218 The court’s
opinion reprints the major documents of the Magisterium dealing with the
issue of ANH which are given extensive analysis by the court including the
Code of Canon Law, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, promulgations by
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, including the 1980
Declaration of Euthanasia, the “Responses” to certain questions of the
USCCB, concerning ANH, and its accompanying Commentary approved by
the Cardinal and the Bishops of the Congregation.219
New York law recognizes advance directives and the appointment of
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a proxy to make health care decisions for incompetent persons.220 In the
absence of such an appointment, a state statute, the New York Family Health
Care Decisions Act (“FHCDA”) applies a presumption of termination of lifesustaining treatment, including nutrition and hydration for a mentally
incompetent person, without the patient ever having indicated a desire for
such termination.221 The court observed that this statute reflects a major
change from “who and under what standards life sustaining treatment may be
terminated for a mentally incompetent [patient].”222 Although a patient could
choose to have ANH withheld by an advance directive, in conformity with
the consensus view on the right to direct withholding of ANH, absent such a
directive, New York had adopted a presumption in favor of life.223 The court
described the previous presumption in favor of providing ANH: “Previously,
absent indication from the principal to the contrary, a ‘presumption of life’
applied. Here, [in the new statute] absent such indication, a ‘presumption of
termination’ applies, especially by deprivation of artificially administered
food and water.”224 The court reasoned that this change reflects a shift toward
a “quality of life” judgment, which is anathema to the Roman Catholic
tradition.225 According to the court, “[u]nder the statue, the ‘quality of life
ethic’ has become the automatic main ethic while the ‘sanctity of life ethic’ is
given the affirmative burden to ‘opt out.’”226 In this case, the court found that
the medical orders on life-sustaining treatments pursuant to the FHCDA
providing for withholding of ANH were unauthorized and violated the
patient’s religious belief and prior request to be artificially administered
nourishment and liquids.227 Here, the patient was a daily communicant at
Mass, and the court determined that food and water directives should be made
in accordance with the patient’s Roman Catholic religious beliefs.228
Close examination of the documents setting out the Church’s
teaching led the court to the conclusion that:
The Catholic Church does not define or consider artificial
administration of food and water as extraordinary or even
medical “treatment,” but it is always defined as ordinary care.
Further, it does not allow the termination of food and water
despite a vegetative state or an advanced Alzheimer’s
condition where the patient is not dying, or if dying, the death
220

Id. at 277.
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is not so imminent, such that the cause of death becomes the
starvation or dehydration, rather than the imminent
underlying condition.229
The court observed that while the patient in the case was not
unconscious, her mere lapse into unconsciousness would not alter the
obligation to continue to provide ANH.230 The court reasoned: “However, if
she were to become permanently unconscious, and not in the actual process
of dying from the underlying condition, the administration of food and water,
which her religion believes is always to be considered comfort or basic care,
even if administered artificially, is obligatory.”231
The court noted that the statute identified a standard providing when
food and water is not required that was generally consistent with Roman
Catholic teaching: (1) when providing food and water is considered an
extraordinary burden; and (2) when life expectations is less than six months
and the patient is unable to take food and water orally.232 The court observed,
however, that the Church rejects the six month life expectancy rule unless the
cause of death were in fact a result of the underlying condition:
The Catholic Church, in addition to considering artificial
administration of food and water as never extraordinary or
even medical “treatment,” as aforesaid, also does not allow
the termination based upon a six-month “quality of life,”
where, again, the cause of death is by starvation or
dehydration, rather than the imminent underlying
condition.233
The court went on to observe that the statute allowed deprivation of
food and water to a patient when its administration “would cause inhumane
pain, suffering, or other burden, under circumstances in which it would be
considered extraordinarily burdensome to a patient . . . who . . . has an
irreversible condition[] . . . .”234 The court noted that the fact of an
“irreversible condition” is irrelevant for application of the Catholic standard
of terminal condition or burdensomeness of treatment.235 According to the
court:
The existence of an irreversible condition is not in itself a
valid or particularly helpful criterion for the Catholic Church,
unless death is imminent coupled with a futility to administer
food and water either due to emerging complications of the
229
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inability of the person’s system to assimilate the food and
water, or “in some rare cases [where] artificial nourishment
and hydration may be excessively burdensome for the patient
or may cause significant discomfort, for example resulting
from complications in the use of the means employed.”236
In a subsequent opinion in the Zornow case, the Supreme Court of
New York clarified the question of whether a physician’s judgment that it was
not medically appropriate to insert a feeding tube would justify withholding
of ANH.237 The court ruled that the physician’s judgment of medical
appropriateness does not override the obligation to provide ANH to the PVS
patient or person with significant cognitive impairment.238 The court noted
that the opinion of revisionist theologians on the issue that was contrary to the
official teaching of the Church was irrelevant to the court’s analysis.239
Instead the court ruled that “the guardians are directed to consult in the future
with theologians or priests, who are more traditional, knowledgeable, and
adhere to the Magisterium’s authoritative standard[] . . . .”240
The court summed up the legal obligation of guardians who are
obligated to make treatment decisions in conformity with Catholic teaching:
However, the difficult task for the guardians is to determine
under Catholic principles when her medical conditions
changes [or exists], such that the treatment is extra-ordinary
rather than ordinary. Extra-ordinary treatment may be denied
to avoid excess or needless pain to the patient in allowing her
to die a natural death without mercy killing, euthanasia, or
doctor /surrogate assisted suicide. The important distinction
is that the underlying medical condition is causing the natural
death.241
The court further warned that there is a need to distinguish the understanding
of withholding ANH in terms of the legal and medical consensus from the
understanding developed by Catholic teaching:
[M]edical conditions will require a judgment by the
guardians [of Catholic patients] of whether the corrective
treatment is “ordinary” versus “extraordinary”. Those terms
used in Catholic theology, differ greatly from the same words
used for medical purposes. It was primarily here, in arriving
at that moral evaluation that the court required consultation
236
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with “a priest or someone well trained in Catholic moral
theology.” Catholics are morally obligated to accept ordinary
treatment, but, although not required, may refuse extra
ordinary treatment, even if the underlying secondary
condition causes death. Accordingly, the guardians may deny
or withhold extra ordinary treatment.242
Administration of ANH to a patient is considered ordinary treatment and must
be administered unless there is evidence of conditions of terminal illness,
burdensomeness or futility.
IX. CONCLUSION
The issue of withholding or withdrawing nutrition and hydration from
the PVS patient, or a patient diagnosed with advanced Alzheimer’s disease,
has become a significant area of dispute between the consensus legal and
medical authorities and the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church’s
Magisterium. Consensus legal and medical authorities maintain an
irrelevancy of distinguishing between nutrition and hydration and other forms
of medical treatment. Life-sustaining treatment that may be withheld from a
patient includes ANH. Statutes providing for withholding life-sustaining
treatments generally treat patients with a diagnosis of PVS the same as
patients with a diagnosis of a terminal condition.
The teaching of the Magisterium is that provisions of nutrition and
hydration, whether natural or by artificial means is ordinary care, which is a
means of preserving life. Such care must be administered to a person in a
vegetative state, or with other significant mental impairment, except where it
cannot be assimilated by the patient’s body or cannot be administered without
causing significant burden such as physical discomfort. The Magisterium has
also declared that a patient in a PVS, as is the case with other patients with
cognitive impairment, is a person with fundamental dignity and must receive
ordinary and proportionate care, which includes provision of ANH.
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